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PREDATORY POLICE: THE ROLE OF ETHICS AND NETWORKS AS MEDIATING FACTORS 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Public officials who place their own interests before those of the public have corrupted a system 
in which they are supposed to act as agents of the public will (Lauchs, 2007). Police are an 
essential part of the Australian justice system and are the frontline actors in keeping the peace 
and social stability and cohesion. Thus good governance relies on honest policing. However, 
there will always be at least a small group of corrupt police officers, even though Australians are 
culturally averse to corruption (Khatri et al., 2006). Police officer’s attract corruption because of 
their ability to enforce or ignore the law and police who are unethical or in financial stress are 
vulnerable to offers of illicit payments. Organised police corruption, which is a subset of organised 
crime, aggravates the situation because it threatens the community by undermining good 
governance. Organised police corruption constitutes “social behaviour, conducted in groups 
within organisations, that is powerful enough to override the officer’s oath of office, personal 
conscience, departmental regulations and criminal laws.” (Punch, 2000) 
 
Police corruption can occur in two ways: passively, where a police officer could be approached by 
a person wishing to ensure the continuance of their illicit activity by bribing police; or proactively 
through predatory policing where police approach the criminals to extort money by providing 
protection (Gerber & Mendelson, 2008). Organised predatory policing is more dangerous than 
individual actions because collaboration between offenders can multiply their income; the income 
of the group is greater than the sum of the income of individuals acting apart (Morselli & 
Tremblay, 2004). There are many historical examples of powerful organised crime syndicates of 
predatory police establishing themselves within the Australian police services. A corrupt police 
network can even extend beyond serving police officers. In Queensland the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
demonstrated that police corruption could reach a sufficient level that it extended its power 
beyond immediate, internal police networks into Cabinet and also effectively ran the organised 
crime that it was bound to prevent, detect and end (Fitzgerald, 1989).  
 
Policing bodies need to understand the nature and structure of these networks to be able to 
better identify and apprehend the targets of their investigations. As Warr has said in relation to 
the policing of delinquents: “…it is difficult to imagine how investigators can develop, defend, or 
test general theories of delinquency without some knowledge of the organization and operation of 
delinquent groups” (Warr, 1996). This paper examines networks of organised crime within police 
agencies. The study will use the UN definition of organised crime: 
…an organized criminal group is a “structured group of three or more persons existing for 
a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit.” By “serious crime” is meant “conduct constituting a criminal offence punishable 
by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty”. 
(United Nations, 2002) 
 
The necessity of studying criminal networks is well established but has not received much 
attention from social network theories (Morselli & Tremblay, 2004). The main contribution of this 
paper is that in uncovering hidden (or confirming) bribe and other corrupt exchanges and their 
associated influence tentacles it provides a better understanding of the nature, structure and 
socialisation processes of these embedded networks. Understanding how corrupt police networks 
are structured and their dynamics affords better opportunities for strategies to be developed to 
interrupt dark networks and re-enforce positive policing practices.  This study is a departure from 
current studies of criminal networks in that it draws on social network analysis to provide rigorous 
data to verify the characteristics of networks and particularly to uncover the hidden relationships 
that support them. 
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Although focused on the Queensland context, this paper is part of a larger study that will 
interrogate predatory police network across Australian jurisdictions. The paper outlines and 
focuses on the first stage of the project being the corrupt police network in Queensland (Australia) 
called ‘the Joke’ that ran from the 1950s to the 1980s.  
 
Corrupt Networks  
 
Social networks form when people interact. Networks are a type of social organisation that rely on 
relationships of trust, mutuality and reciprocity, coupled with a set of common norms established 
and maintained through peer pressure, social approval and sanction (stigma), to bind individuals 
to a collective unit. The characteristic ability of networks to be inclusive, flexible in their operation 
and quick to respond networks can be leveraged to benefit individuals, groups or businesses or 
society at large.   
 
However, as Raab and Milward (2003) have noted networks can also have a dark side, where the 
network achievements come at the cost of other individuals, groups or societies.  It has been 
argued that the particularism of networks, that is, the banding together to pursue particular or 
common interests, is a key element of network disadvantage since it can lead to exclusivity rather 
than an inclusive approach (Taylor and Hoggett, 1994). Such inclusivity renders networks as 
essentially private rather than public entities and therefore not exposed to wider levels of scrutiny 
or subject to external accountability regimes. Because of this, networks can be quite secret and 
invisible in their operation and endeavours.  
 
This opaque nature of networks and their lack of transparency, coupled with values and norms 
that support clandestine actions and goals, can provide a basis for corruption. Granovetter (1992: 
45) points out” networks can create their own norms at odds with the outside world to the point 
where they become a ‘law unto themselves”. In such a context, illegal activities can take on the 
aura of normality and members protect each other from the sanctions of the outside world.   
 
This project will fill the gap by providing the information on corrupt police networks in Australia. It 
will be the first to study each of the separate inquiries into Australian police corruption and 
convert information from the inquiries into useful data for corruption prevention, detection or 
investigation; turn the unanalysed information and into actionable intelligence (Dean and 
Gottschalk, 2007). The project will provide insights into the structure and dynamics of their 
operation by unpacking the topology of their interconnections and increase understanding of 
points of intervention and strategies to sure up or insulate ‘good networks’ and stop them tipping 
over the edge and to the ‘dark side’. 
 
Methodology 
 
The project will take place in three stages. First, data will be extracted from police inquiries into 
corruption and the corrupt networks plotted as network maps. Then organised crime theory will be 
used to examine the networks. Network analysis theories will be used to identify the strengths 
and weaknesses of the police networks to target strategies for detection, investigation and 
prevention. 
 
Social Network Analysis: Network analysis is an empirical tool which can be used to identify, 
measure, visualise (map) and analyse the ties between people, groups and organisations (Scott, 
1991: 113). It plots relationships between individuals or entities by representing them as nodes 
and showing their relationships by linking nodes with lines. Lines can have different depictions to 
indicate characteristics of links including frequency and method of contact. The nodes and lines 
form a network map that reveals relationships between members of the network such as gate 
keeping (controlling the network), liaisons and core and periphery members’ (Keast and Brown, 
2005). In doing so, it uncovers the often hidden or opaque patterns of interaction and enables the 
underlying structure of relationships to become more apparent (Cross, Borgatti and Parker, 
2002).   
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Network metrics, mathematical calculations or measures, make it possible to gain deeper insights 
into the actual texture and operation of the networks. The metrics applied to this study include: 
 
Density – In simple terms, is a measure of the number of actual connections compared to the 
total number of possible connections. The higher the density ratio - the higher the level of 
cohesion within a network. Density values range from 0 to 1: the closer the score to 1 the higher 
the level of connection.  
 
Centrality - gives an indication of how concentrated a network is – do a small number of people 
control the flow of resources, or is it distributed more widely through a number people. This 
measure provides useful insights into where influence and power maybe concentrated, or to the 
location of blockages or key flow points.  The centralisation score is expressed as a percentage 
and can vary for 0 (every member is connected to every other member) to 100 (all members are 
connected to only one member). A high centralisation score indicates that some network actors 
have many more connections than others. 
 
Average Path Distance – is an indication of how easy it is to navigate around the network. This 
measure provides insights into how close or removed certain actors are and as a consequence 
their level of knowledge of flows. 
 
There are limitations to this study. First, the data sources are imperfect and rely on evidence 
produced at police inquiries and reminiscences of participants. Neither source of data is 
complete. Moreover, the latter can be highly unreliable. However, these are the best sources 
available. Secondly, network maps may plot relationships that have been identified by a third 
party without the benefit of confirmation. Thus the appearance of a name on a map may imply a 
type of relationship that never existed. In view of this, network maps should be read cautiously 
and only in connection with the accompanying commentary in which the details of relationships 
can be expanded. In this way, as Rogers (1985) contends network analysis can serve to ‘turbo 
charge’ case study information.  
 
Data Source 
 
Data for networks should include as much as possible of the data set, in this case the corrupt 
network. It is difficult to obtain information on criminal networks and most information available is 
unreliable. Data gathered from informers and incarcerated gang members cannot be checked 
because researchers cannot know the true size of the people involved. The nature of modern 
criminal enterprises means that membership and relationships are temporary and constantly in 
flux. For example, a core group of criminals may deal with different specialists for each job. These 
problems are reduced in an examination of police corruption such as this as the raw data utilised 
has been compiled through the comprehensive investigatory and coercive powers of formal 
Commissions of Inquiry. Corruption is a routine operation as opposed to the varied operation of a 
criminal network. Payments are made regularly by the same people to the same people. 
Natarajan notes that often researchers try to establish these factors through interviews with 
participants. Obviously, there is limited scope for this option and he has demonstrated that 
network analysis can reveal a great deal about these relationships without relying on interviews 
(Natarajan, 2006). Thus there is much greater certainty when studying the network or more 
qualitative data on the nature of members of the network. In this project the data is pre-packaged 
in the inquiry reports.  
 
The principle data source for this project consists of reports from the Fitzgerald (1989), Wood 
(1997) and Kennedy (2004) Inquiries, as well as the Victorian Ombudsman’s Report on the Ceja 
Taskforce (Ombudsman Victoria 2003). Given this paper’s specific focus on the Queensland 
policy corruption networks a content analysis of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) report has been 
undertaken to distil three key variables of bribes, corrupt support which are central to police 
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corruption: bribes, transference of bribes and corrupt support. The data used in the network maps 
in this paper were specifically derived from Fitzgerald (1989) and Herbert and Gilling (2004). 
The relational data derived from the content analysis were collated and arrayed into matrices for 
each of the key variables identified above. From this starting point, network maps were 
constructed using UCINET6.  
The resulting network maps were used to provide visual representations, of the nature and 
patterns of exchanges occurring within corrupt networks as well as the overall 
architecture/topology of the network. Associated network metric measures will provide additional 
and deeper insights into the structure and operation of the networks.  
 
 
Analysis and Discussion: Uncovering Patterns, Structures and Roles of a Corrupt Police 
Network 
 
The Corruption Network 
 
No one knows when police corruption commenced in the Queensland Licensing Branch (QLB) 
within the Queensland Police Force (QPF). It is known however, that the corrupt network, or 
Joke, as it was known, was endemic by the 1950s. The corruption took the form of payments 
being made from bookmakers, prostitutes and operators of illegal gambling games to officers 
from the QLB in return for protection. The protection was reciprocal: payers would be warned of 
raids by non-corrupt officers and the payers would provide low level employees for token arrests 
for the payees so that they could record a satisfactory 'clean up rates' for vice in Queensland. If 
the Wood Commission definitions are applied the corruption was both systemic, in so far as it was 
self-perpetuating within the QLB and entrenched, because the corrupt officers had alliances in 
place to defend their corrupt network from inquiries or interference (Wood 1977, para.2.4). In 
network terms the Joke was an exclusive network that maintained a legitimate public face, 
concealing an invisible web of corrupt relationships. These relationships had developed to a 
strategic level to protect the inner web from external examination or attack.  
 
Network Map 1has been created using the variables of bribe payments (bribe), distribution of 
bribes amongst police officers (Joke Payment), and support via illegal actions to ensure that the 
Joke is maintained and continued (corrupt support). Aggregating the links (bribes, joke payments 
and corrupt support) provides an overview of the structure, composition and flow of the predatory 
police network in Queensland. For ease of reading and analysis the links have been coloured 
coded such that green =    , red, and blue = corrupt support.   
 The network appears fairly convoluted because of the ad hoc nature of its creation. The network 
centres on four key players: the organiser, Jack Herbert who took over the organiser role, the 
former commissioner Frank Bischof and Tony Murphy, who had formed strategic relationships 
supporting the Joke. On the periphery are the bribers (SP bookies, prostitutes including Shirley 
Brifman, politicians such as Don Lane and illegal gaming operators like Robinson, Scognamiglo 
and Bellino), the police officers and their wives. 
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Network Map 1: Aggregate Linkages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data used to produce this map also generated a suite of network metrics that afford deeper 
insights into the structural properties of the network. The first metric – density – provides an 
indication of the degree of cohesion evident. Table 1 sets out the density measures for Network 
Map 1 (aggregate ties)  It is interesting to note that for each of the three relationship types or links 
– Bribe, Joke Payment and Corrupt Support – there is an escalating level of density. 
 
 
 Bribe 
 Joke Payment 
 Corrupt Support 
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Table 1: Density of Network Ties  
 Density No. of Ties 
Bribe 0.0144    9 
Joke Payment 0.0192  12 
Corrupt Support 0.0368          23 
 
 
Density represents how close knit the network is, and is an indicator of the strength of the 
network.1  As the table shows with nine (9) ties the Bribe sub net is comprised of a small group of 
actors with relatively few interactions beyond the basic bribe exchange. This small size, coupled 
with a low density measure of 0.0144, indicates that the Bribe sub network is loose in its structure 
and exhibits a low level of cohesion. This means that this network is small, contained and loosely 
coupled involving those people immediately involved in the bribe exchange. The Joke Payment is 
comprised of both a slightly higher number of ties (12) and density level (0.0192). This result 
makes sense as the participants are all Queensland police officers and most belong to the 
Licensing Branch. Alternatively, the bribe sub net group members are unconnected individuals 
who deal with the police and do not interact with each other.  
 
The third set of ties, Corrupt Support, is the event that characterises most ties in the network (23) 
and displays the highest level of density at 0.0368 for this network.  Although this measure is low 
by normal standards, it is apparent that the corrupt network operates to provide a slightly denser 
web of connections that support and implicitly condone the illegal activities of the Bribe and Joke 
sub networks.  
 
The overall low density measures for the Network Map (aggregate ties) highlights the low degree 
of connection between actors. A loosely coupled network is a necessary feature for a clandestine 
entity such as the corrupt police network which operates mostly under the radar, with players 
from different areas connecting the network (i.e. if it was too dense the corruption would be more 
recognisable). Another consequence of its confidential nature is the network’s broken 
up/destructed format; one of the few central players is removed the network and information held 
between the others is disconnected. 
 
 
A further measure indicating the structure and operation of the network is the average path 
distance.  That is, how easily it is for members to make contact or exchanges with others. In this 
case the average distance among reachable pairs = 1.000. This means that amongst those 
people who are connected, on average they only need to travel one path/edge to reach another 
player they are not connected to. This finding is likely a feature of the relatively small size of the 
network.  However, it does point to the fact that there is little distance between actors and 
therefore it is unlikely that those involved, even those on the peripheries were not aware of the 
activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Density is a ratio of the number of actual ties out of the number of all possible ties with a node 
that met all the ties having a rating of 1.  
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Network Map 2: Reciprocal Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 Reciprocal Ties 
 Unreciprocated 
Ties 
 
A deeper interrogation of the network reveals that there exists a level of reciprocity between 
particular players. Reciprocity indicates that there is a two way, or reciprocal, relationship 
between actors. This reciprocity gives the network or the set of actors engaged in this behaviour 
with a higher level of robustness, thus re-enforcing the actions.  While reciprocal relationships can 
mean the exchange of like for like, in this case reciprocal ties between network actors are not ties 
of the same relationships. Bookies, gamers and prostitutes paid bribes were made in return for 
protection, by Licensing Branch officers, of their illegal activities. Individual QLB officers who were 
members of the Joke would take payments of about £20/month from their "own" Starting Price 
bookmakers (SP Bookies) from all over Queensland and even over the NSW border (Herbert & 
Gilling 2004, 55). The payments would be passed to a person known as the 'organiser' who 
would distribute the money both within the QLB and to key senior officers outside the Branch. 
Payments were not equal and the size varied with the importance of the officer (Fitzgerald 1989, 
32 & Herbert 52). The organiser kept a list of the payers and their phone numbers and ensured 
there was always a Joke member on duty who could warn payers of upcoming raids.  
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Licensing Branch officers shared their bribes with senior police in return for an assurance than 
there would be no effective investigation of their illegal activity, thus ensuring the protection and 
perpetuation of the Joke. The reciprocity was not necessarily provided on a one to one basis. For 
example, Herbert collected bribes and distributed them to the officers who would protect the 
bribers. Thus some of the bribers do not have reciprocal links with Herbert and likewise the 
Unknown Licensing Branch Officers do not have reciprocal links with bribers. The reciprocity was 
provided by the network rather than the individual. Nonetheless there are strong reciprocal links 
in the centre of the network between police officers. This is because the protection provided by 
senior officers was directly reciprocal. Two different systems of trust operated: within the 
Licensing Branch officers could trust each other sufficiently for separate people to collect bribes 
and others to provide protection, while protecting the Joke was a more exclusive affair where the 
corrupt senior police did not trust others to provide the protection. Reciprocal relationships are the 
corner stone of the network. If they could be disrupted then the raison d’être of the Joke would 
cease to exist. If the Licensing Branch could not protect the illegal operators then they would not 
bribe them and if the senior police could not protect the Joke then they would not receive their 
share.  
 
Network Map 3: Identifying Key Actors  
The following map demonstrates a further vulnerability of the network in the form of its key 
players. The map identifies the strength of relationships by the size of the boxes for each player. 
The three largest boxes are Frank Bischof, Tony Murphy and Jack Herbert. Potentially the 
removal of one or all of these from the network could disrupt or end the Joke.  
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Table 2: Centralization Measures 
 
 Centralization (%) 
Bribe 13.5 
Joke Payment 18 
Corrupt Support 25.25 
 
The higher the percentage in centralization indicates that some actors have more connections 
than others. This measure is based on the number of ties to the actor. Table two indicates that 
the Bribe sub net has a centralisation percentage of (13.5%). Although low, this highlights that in 
relation to bribes, some actors are more connected than others. Similarly, the Joke Payment sub 
net, reflects a low centralization measure (18%). The Corrupt Support sub net scores the highest 
measure of centralization (25.25%), showing that in corrupt support relations slightly over one 
quarter of ties are directed towards certain actors. Table 2 emphasises the percentage to which 
ties are central to particular actors and Map 3 is an aggregate of these ties, visualising who these 
actors are. 
 
Bischof was not present in the network for the duration of the period under review. Bischof was 
made Police Commissioner in 1958. He had been a member of the Joke for some years and 
used his position of authority to support its continuation (Fitzgerald 1989, 31).He retired and was 
replaced by Norwin Bauer. This event did not disrupt the network because Bauer was already a 
member of the Joke and maintained the supervisory and protective role of his predecessor. Jack 
Herbert likewise took over this position from a string of former organisers. Herbert was transferred 
to the Licensing Branch 1959 and stayed till 1974 (Fitzgerald 1989, 32). Herbert was made the 
organiser in 1964 because he kept the phone numbers of SP Bookies up to date (Herbert & 
Gilling 2004, 52). Once in this position he also became responsible for initiating new members to 
the Joke (Fitzgerald 1989, 33). When he was away Herbert's wife Peggy used to take new phone 
numbers from SPs and pass them on to other officers. According to Herbert, half of the QLB 
officers were members of the Joke and most of their wives knew they were (Herbert & Gilling 
2004, 53-54). Herbert could conceivably be replaced just as he had replaced a previous 
organiser. Murphy, on the other hand, played a more significant role. His power in the network 
was dependent on his relationships rather than his position. He held this influential role while 
serving in a number of jobs both within and outside the Licensing Branch. It appears his function 
was as a relationships facilitator. Thus he would not easily have been replaced by another corrupt 
officer backfilling his position. The only possible successor with similar relationships was Terry 
Lewis. Murphy’s removal would have severely disrupted, if not ended, the network. 
 
The Joke did not operate completely below the radar and relied on corrupt support when 
allegations of corruption arose. An example of the system of support can be demonstrated when 
the most serious threat to the Joke occurred with the National Hotel Inquiry in 1964 (Gibbs 1964). 
One of the staff of the National Hotel, a pub in central Brisbane, told an opposition politician that 
the Hotel provided free alcohol and meals to Bischof, Tony Murphy, and Bauer in return for them 
turning a blind eye to prostitution and after-hours sales of alcohol. Despite two employees coming 
forward to give evidence in support of the claims, the Inquiry did not find any proof of wrong-
doing. This was assisted by officers, such as Herbert, and other witnesses such as Shirley 
Brifman, a prostitute who had worked at the National Hotel, giving false evidence before the 
Inquiry. Joke members were also willing to take direct action to protect themselves. This mainly 
took the form of discrediting or professionally destroying their enemies, but on rare occasions 
more serious action was taken. For example, in 1971, Shirley Brifman made claims to the media 
that she had perjured herself before the National Hotel Inquiry and spelt out the corruption that 
was occurring. Brifman was subsequently interviewed by Queensland police officers, and in 1972 
charges were laid against Tony Murphy for perjury. But this case fell over when Brifman died of a 
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drug overdose a month later. Unsubstantiated allegations have been made by Brifman's family 
that Tony Murphy forced Brifman to commit suicide (Fitzgerald 1989, 34). 
 
Network Map 4: Corrupt Support   
 
 
Network Map 4 (Corrupt Support) extends the visual representation provided in Network Map 1 
where it was noted that corrupt relations provide a foundation for the overall network. A more 
isolated view of this tie reveals a point of fragility within the Joke.  First, there were two networks 
of corrupt support: support between QLB officers and support between police and bribers. 
Second, there link between the two groups were Bischof and Murphy. Given that corrupt support 
was essential for the Joke to operate the reliance on the position of police commissioner and a 
relationships facilitator like Murphy shows that the Joke was extremely brittle. 
 
The network also benefitted from a further layer of political alliances which could legitimately 
frustrate attempts to investigate or terminate the Joke. The primary player was the Queensland 
Police Union of Employees (QPUE). There is no evidence that the union executive were aware of 
corrupt activity but the QPUE always took the stance of defending members against allegations of 
corruption and consequently obfuscating the actions of those who tried to bring change to the 
Police Force (Fitzgerald 1989, 35). In the National Hotels Inquiry, the QPUE provided legal 
support to 88 officers who were named by investigators (Fitzgerald 1989, 34). Further support 
came from the Premier of Queensland, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, who made a political alliance 
with the QPUE. The Premier did his best to stop change occurring in the QPF in return for the 
public support of the QPUE and police officers for his hard-line law and order policies (Fitzgerald 
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1989, 36). Once again there is no evidence that Bjelke-Petersen had knowledge of, or received 
any payments from, the Joke. 
 
Network Disruption 
 
But the “Joke’ network was not indestructible and it only took ‘a few good men’ to bring it down. 
The first of these was Allen Hodges who upon becoming Minister of Police in May 1969, began 
instituting changes in the QPF in accordance with a review conducted by South Australian Police 
Commissioner, John McKinna. One of his first reforms was to replace Bauer as Police 
Commissioner with Ray Whitrod, a non-Queenslander. Whitrod was a righteously honest officer 
who tried to clean up the Queensland Police Force and modernise its operation. This rankled the 
rank and file membership and created an immediate and long-lasting conflict with the QPUE and 
by association, the Premier. One of Whitrod's reforms was to set up the Crime Intelligence Unit 
(CIU) under Gulbransen with the power to investigate police and specific instructions to keep 
watch on the QLB (Fitzgerald 1989, 38). He also transferred Tony Murphy and Terry Lewis to 
country postings away from the action of the Joke (Fitzgerald 1989, 43).  
 
These developments would not have been enough to close down the Joke. The outer layer of 
support mobilised with the QPUE and the Premier openly opposing the new Commissioner. The 
QPUE, with Bjelke-Petersen’s acquiescence, advised its members not to cooperate with CIU 
(Fitzgerald 1989, 38) and actively opposing Whitrod’s reforms and denied his allegations of 
corruption in the QLB (Fitzgerald 1989, 36). But the removal of Bauer, Murphy and Lewis meant 
that the corrupt support network was broken; the new police commissioner was not only a non-
member of the Joke but actively opposed corruption, also both the relationship facilitator, Murphy, 
and his only possible replacement, Lewis, were geographically isolated from each other and the 
Joke. But the end of the Joke came when appointed Bill Osborne as head of the QLB. Osborne 
had been a member of the Branch for 10 years and knew how the Joke worked, even if he was 
never a member. Osborne informed Herbert that the Joke had to stop. The members had to 
comply because Osborne's knowledge of the system meant they couldn't trick him and keep the 
Joke going (Herbert & Gilling 2004, 74). Herbert and others transferred out of QLB in 1974 
(Fitzgerald 1989, 38) Herbert went to the Public Relations Office and retired medically unfit 3 
months later. The Joke couldn't continue without a senior officer involved (Herbert & Gilling 2004, 
74-75). Future research will discuss the return of corruption, known as the Second Joke, when 
the corrupt support network was re-established by the appointment of Lewis as Police 
Commissioner in Whitrod’s stead, and the reappointment of Murphy to Brisbane.  
 
Implications  
 
This network analysis has revealed two strategic characteristics of the Joke. First, Jack Herbert, 
the organiser, held a central position in the network. Whilst not having exclusive control of the 
movement of money, he was the conduit for most of the payments and the repository of the 
intelligence on participants. His value is corroborated by his importance as a protected witness in 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry into the corrupt network. The second, and more important, discovery is the 
role of multiple layers of protection in ensuring the survival of the network. This was alluded to in 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry but the report did not explicitly layout the nature of the protection that 
occurred. The protection took two forms: protection provided by senior police officers including 
police commissioners who could control inquiries into misconduct and corruption, and political 
alliances with powerful individuals who could obfuscate the work of reformers. 
 
Ray Whitrod intuitively broke the Joke organisation through key appointments and transfers. He 
was able to remove the strategic personalities who protected the Joke from detection and 
investigation. In doing so he did not affect any arrests or convictions of Joke participants but 
Whitrod created an environment which was toxic for the survival of the network; it was too 
dangerous for the network participants to operate without the protection from scrutiny provided by 
the senior police. 
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There are three avenues for further research based on this project. The first is to determine 
further strengths and weaknesses of the networks via organisational theory and establish 
practical strategies for detection, investigation and prevention within the police service. A further 
step will be to map the Second Joke. This will be followed by network analysis of the corrupt 
networks investigated by the Wood Royal Commission in New South Wales (Wood 1997) and the 
Kennedy Inquiry in Western Australia (Kennedy 2004).  
 
When the project is complete the methodology can be repeated in other jurisdictions. For 
example, there are a plethora of inquiries into police corruption in the United States of America 
which could be examined. The project could be also be repeated in other corrupt networks. Many 
non-policing public officials with significant decision making powers can also act in a predatory 
manner, for example, licensing, housing, and other agencies in which an official has the ability to 
affect the livelihood or basic standard of living of their clients. An immediate opportunity would 
come from the New South Wales ICAC investigations into corruption in Rail Corp (Independent 
Commission Against Corruption, 2008). The findings of this research can be used for further 
projects to determine preventative and investigative strategies that could be applied to all 
government agencies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper is the commencement of a project to analyse police corruption networks in Australia. It 
has covered the initial study of the Joke, a bribery network operating in Queensland from the 
1950s to the 1970s. Analysis began with plotting of the movement of money and corrupt support 
within the network. This network map was broken down to reveal the relationships between the 
participants. The first finding was the reliance on reciprocal ties to maintain the Joke. An analysis 
of network structure and strength identified four key players being the police commissioner, the 
relationships facilitator, the organiser and Jack Herbert (who took over and expanded the role of 
organiser). This in itself did not reveal the true vulnerabilities of the network. While each of these 
players were important some were replaceable. However, a further map of the corrupt support 
network, an essential part of the Joke, revealed that the key links were the police commissioner 
and the relationships manager. History had shown that the network had the strength to control the 
position of commissioner most of the time, but the relationships manager, Tony Murphy, was 
extremely difficult to replace. The end of the First Joke occurred when the new Police Minister, 
Hodges, replaced the commissioner with Whitrod, who in turn, removed Murphy and his only 
viable replacement, Lewis, from Brisbane, thereby cutting them out of the network. 
 
This study has demonstrated that the ‘Joke’ exhibited many of the characteristics of a ‘dark’ 
network.  A set of internal norms ordered relations and behaviours allowed for the formation of a 
loose membership extending to higher levels of police and political authority. Entrenched by 
implicit and explicit support the Joke was hidden within the legitimate operation of the 
Queensland police service. By uncovering the patterns of relationship, composition and key 
actors’ network analysis has provided those responsible for the policing of corrupt police 
networks.  In short, network analysis provides a way to move beyond intuition to informed 
decision making.  
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